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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH I

Plaintiff-Respondent,
No. 14840

vs.
JOHNNIE OWEN WADE I

Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
Johnnie Owen Wade was charged in a criminal proceeding by the State of Utah, of the offense of three counts
of automobile homicide in violation of Utah Code Annotated,
76-5-207 (Supp. 1977).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On September 27, 1976, Johnnie Owen Wade was found
guilty of automobile homicide as charged in the information
by the Judge,

Allen B. Sorenson, sitting without a jury, in the

Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, State
of Utah and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 to 5
Years in the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks an Order of their Court reversing
the finding of guilty as entered by the Trial Court, and the
entry of an order dismissing any action against the Defendan:
or, in the al terna ti ve, a ruling remanding the case for a ne·;
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involves the deaths of three individuals
in an automobile accident which occured on May 10, 1976, in
Utah County, State. of Utah.

The Defendant, Johnnie Owen

Wade

was charged with automobile hom±cide in connection with this
accident.
At trial, the first witness was Myrna Butler, an
employee of a cafe in Santaquin, Utah.

( T. 14) .

She testifiei

that at about 7: 30 until about 10: 30, on May 10, 1976, she
observed the Defendant and Leo Craig Fenster at the cafe and
observed both of them drinking beer.

(T.16).

The second witness was Leo Fenster, who was present
the time
the Defendant in the Defendant's pick-up truck at

the Defendant
He state d t h at When he and
· le (T.;:
· S antaquin,
·
h e was dri· vi· ng the vehic ·
t h e ca f e in

collision.
left

c:.

(T. 21).
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After stopping at the Defendant's girl friend's house
i:i Santaquin, the Defendant drove the truck out of Santaquin,
west on the two lane highway toward Goshen, Utah.

(T.29).

Mr.

Fenster said that there was nothing unusual about the manner in
which the Defendant was driving the truck that evening (T.32).
He said the truck was traveling at a normal speed of about
fifty to sixty miles an hour.

(T.33).

He recalled that the

truck proceeded around a right-hand curve in the road without
any problem. ( T. 3 4) .

He described his observations immediately

prior to the head-on collision as follows:
"As we was coming around the turn, when I looked
back I could see the headlights and they were
starting to come across the railroad tracks, because they were moving, you know, coming across
the tracks, and, anyway, it looked to me that
the lights started to come over into our lane
and, anyway, I just looked at John and I said
"John, look out." I thought for a minute what
was going on. You know, it went through my mind.
And I turned and I looked at John. I said, "John,
look out. We are going to hit." And then it
seemed like we just crashed. Then I could see
John. He had ahold of the steering wheel, you
know, and it crashed and he went out. (T.34).
The third witness was Thomas Cox, of Payson, Utah,
who was the dri· ver of the 1974 Honda Civic automobile
·
· wh ic
· h
in
his wife and two children were riding.

(T.36)

He

~estified

that he was going east down Highway 91 at about fifty-five
miles Per hour at about 11:00 p.m. on May 10, 1976. (T.39).
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He stated that he observed headlights of another vehicle
coming in the opposite direction which appeared to be in k
lane of traffic.

(T. 39).

He recalled dust coming up fromt\:

shoulder of the road next to the east bound lane of traffic.
(T. 40).

He swerved to the left into the other lane of

traff;

because he believed that the other vehicle would continue
straight ahead in his lane of traffic.

(T.41).

The State called as a witness, T. Robert Hogan, a
physician, who testified that Debra, Malinda, and Jeremy cox
were all killed as a result of the accident. (T.52).
The evidence indicated that the Defendant was give:,
a blood test at 1:20 a.m. on May 11, 1976, at the Payson
Hospital.

(T. 64.) , and that as a result of chemical analysis

the blood-alchol was . 12 grams of alcohol per hundred grams:'
blood.

(T. 73).
The next witness for the State was Michael Okelber::

who was the driver of the vehicle which was behind the 191~
Honda prior to the collision.

(T.83).

He stated that from

about one-half mile away he observed the taillights of the Co'
vehicle, and the headlights of the vehicle driven by the oefe
dan t.
out.

( T. 8 5 ) .
(T.85).

He said that at the same time both of the l[c:
On cross-examination, he admitted that he neve:

s in front of:
saw the headlights of the Defen d ants t rue k Cros
· movements of t he
victims car and never say any erra t 1c
of the Defendant's vehicle.

head!::

(T.95).
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e

Gary N. Johnson, a trooper for the Utah Highway
Patrol, was called as an expert witness.

(T. 96) •

He

testified that the point of impact ocurred five feet into
the westbound lane of traffic, the lane of traffic in which
the Defendant was traveling and not in the lane in which the
victim's vehicle was traveling.

(T.99).

The road was

thirty-two feet wide at the point of impact.

(T.101).

A written statement made by the Defendant, which
substantially corroborated the testimony of Craig "Red"
Fenster, the passenger in his vehicle, was introduced into
evidence.

The Defendant stated that he said "Red said,

'look out, there's a car' and "I turned the wheel and there
was an imp0;ct." T.110).

Upon questioning, the Defendant

said he turned the wheel to the right.

(T.111).

Both the State and the Defense offered expert
witnesses who testified extensively on the basis of the
photographs taken of the vehicles and the skid marks at the
~ene.

(T.106, T.143).

Each of the experts reached different

conclusions from the evidence as to the possible position of
the truck, in relation to the Honda, prior to impact. {T.106,
T.14 3) •
I.

THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE AT TRIAL WAS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE

OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE.

bn
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The appellant's case was tried without a jury
to the trial judge, the Honorable Allen Sorensen.

The

appellant made a motion to dismiss the case at the close of
the State's evidence on the ground that the State had
failed to prove a prima facie case of Automobile Homicide.
(T. 140).
case.

This motion renewed at the c:lose of the defendan:

(T. 169).

In response to Appellant's motion, the Court
expressly found that there had been no showing of any
criminal negligence.

( T. 16 9 ) •

When the case was submitted.

the Judge made the following ruling:
"THE COURT:
Well, I find that the defendant
was driving a motor vehicle on a public
highway under the influence of liquor,
intoxicating liquor, within the meaning
of the statute and that he was negligent
in that he was on the wrong side of the
road and that that negligence was a cause
of the death of each of the persons contained
in each of the counts. I expressly do not
find that he was criminally negligent within
the meaning of the statute, and I therefore
find him guilty." (T. 172).

The Appellant submits that the evidence does
not support the finding of negligence on the part of the
defendant.

The evidence presented at trial indicates that

the point of impact between the two vehicles occurred in
the westbound lane of traffic, the lane in which the APP
was operating his vehicle, and not in the victims' lane
of traffic.

(T. 99).

The exhibits and photographs

rest north of
indicate that the victims' vehicle came to
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elli'.

the highway next to the westbound lane of traffic.

The

expert witness, David Lord, who testified on the part of
the defendant,

(T. 142 to 168), was of the opinion that

damage to both vehicles as shown by the photographs did not
indicate that the victims' vehicle, the Honda, made contact
with the defendant's truck in the manner described by the
driver of the Honda.

(T. 153).

The fact that the defendant was in the proper
lane of traffic was further corroborated by the testimony
of Craig Finster.

(T. 21).

Mr. Finster, the passenger

in the defendant's truck, observed the collision and was

the only witness with a present recollection of the events
following the accident.

He stated that he observed the

other vehicle cross a set of railroad tracks and start
to come over into the westbound lane of traffic.

(T. 34).

Prior to the accident he did not notice any erratic movements
of the truck, and noted nothing unusual concerning the
defendant's driving pattern.

(T. 33).

The statement

of the Appellant introduced into evidence is consistent
with the account of the accident made by Mr. Finster.
(T. 110).

The Appellant submits that the State did not meet
the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt in light of the above-described facts.
this Court

Therefore,

f

.
.
a ter reviewing the record and evidence should

set a.· d

si, e the judgment of conviction in this matter and
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award the Appellant a new trial.
II.
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT EXPRESSLY RULED THAT
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT, THE DEFENDANT
CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE.
In State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah, 1977),
the Court dealt with the conflict which exists between
the language of the automobile homicide statute, Utah Code
Annotated, 76-5-207 (Supp. 1977) and the provisions of
the Utah Criminal Code which define the requisite elements
of mental intent, Utah Code Annotated 76-2-101, 76-2-103,
and 76-5-201.
Justice Ellett, writing the majority opinion,
expressly found that the element of criminal negligence
was present in that case, 561 P.2d at 1058, and held that
the Court had correctly instructed the jury.

The ruling

of that case does not remove the necessity of a finding of
criminal negligence in an automobile homicide case.
In Appellant's case, the trial judge expressly
held that the defendant was not criminally negligent.
(T. 169, T. 172).

Therefore, the State did not prove each

element of the case beyond a reasonable doubt and the
defendant's conviction should be reversed.
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III.
THIS COURT SHOULD OVERRULE STATE V. DURRANT AND
~

V. ANDERSON TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE DECISIONS HOLD

THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CRIMINAL CODE ARE NOT

APPLICABLE TO THE OFFENSE OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE.
In State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977),
Justice Ellett described the scope of the ruling in the
case of State v. Durrant as follows:
"The holding in the Durrant case was
to the effect that simple negligence in
the driving of a motor vehicle which causes
the death of another person is all that is
required when the driver is so under the
influence of liquor as to be unable to drive
his car in a reasonably safe and prudent
manner."
C. F. Maughn, Justice, dissenting at 561 P.2d 1058 and
561 P.2d 1063.

The Appellant submits that this decision violates
Article V, Section I of the Utah State Constitution.

That

section prohibits this Court as a separate department of
government from exercising a power properly belonging
to the legislative department of the State government.
State v. Johnson, 44

u.

18, 137 P. 632 (1913).

As a result

of the ruling set forth in Durrant and Anderson, this
Court has effectively repealed several provisions of Utah
Criminal Code , i.e.,
.
Sections 76-2-101, 76-2-103, and
76-5-201. Th e repeal of these sections of the law of the
State ·
is properly the province of the Legislature and
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not the Supreme Court.
A clear conflict now exists in the Utah Criminal
Code, Utah Code Annotated 76-1-101 et. ~' between the
section which defines Criminal Hamic ide, Utah Code Annotatec
76-5-201 (Supp. 1977) and the section defining Automobile
Homicide 76-5-207 (Supp. 1977).

A person can be convicted

of Criminal Homicide by acting with simple negligence if
he is under the influence of alcohol as defined by the
statute and unlawfully causes the death of another.
The Appellant submits that this Court should
reconsider the ruling announced in State v. Durrant and
State v. Anderson and overrule those dee is ions by adopting
the reasoning set forth in the dissent and holding that
a person must be found to act with criminally negligent in
order to be convicted of Automobile Homicide.
Durrant was a three to two decision with one
member who is not presently with the Court.

In ~·

Justice Ellett, speaking of the decision in Gibb v. ~'
533 P.2d 299 (Utah 1975), stated:
"That case is of small value since it
was decided by a divided court, three
to two, and two of the three members
who favored the decision are no longer
with the Court." 561 P. 2d at 1057.
reversed
The Appellant's conviction should b e
. case that
because of the express finding entered in this
of the defendar:
there was no criminal negligence on the part
order dismissing
and the trial court directed to enter an
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any further action against the appellant.
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